Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/214530 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CREMA Working Paper No. 2013-05
Verlag: 
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA), Zürich
Zusammenfassung: 
We exploit a natural measure of congruence between politicians and their constituency' bnm bnnb fgvhjuis preferences to directly quantify the extent of legislative shirking and evaluate the mechanism of the median voter model. The median voter model explains the behavior of politicians with respect to revealed preferences of their constituency about 18.8 percentage points better than a random decision benchmark. However, it fails to account for a substantial part of its theoretical prediction of convergence. Nevertheless, competition for voters under majority rule crowds out individual charact eristics and party affiliations as potential factors which explain legislative shirking.
Schlagwörter: 
Constituents' Preferences
Median Voter Model
Political Economy
JEL: 
D7
H7
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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