Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/213445 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 230
Version Description: 
Revised version, December 2019
Publisher: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Abstract: 
We examine the implications of limited consumer attention for the targeting decisions of competing firms. Limited attention alters the strategic role of information provision as firms may become incentivized to behave as mass advertisers, despite perfect targeting abilities. We analyze the consequences of limited attention for targeting, strategic pricing, market shares, attention competition between firms, and the value of marketing data to firms. Accounting for limited attention in an otherwise standard targeting framework can explain several recent key issues from the advertising industry, such as consumer-side information overload or the increased usage of ad blocking tools.
Subjects: 
Targeted Advertising
Limited Attention
Ad Avoidance
Salience
JEL: 
D43
L13
M37
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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