Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/211128 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
cemmap working paper No. CWP35/19
Publisher: 
Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice (cemmap), London
Abstract: 
This paper develops identification and estimation methods for dynamic structural models when agents' actions are unobserved by econometricians. We provide conditions under which choice probabilities and latent state transition rules are nonparametrically identified with a continuous state variable in a single-agent dynamic discrete choice model. Our identification results extend to (1) models with serially correlated unobserved heterogeneity and continuous choices, (2) cases in which only discrete state variables are available, and (3) dynamic discrete games. We apply our method to study moral hazard problems in US gubernatorial elections. We find that the probabilities of shirking increase as the governors approach the end of their terms.
Subjects: 
dynamic discrete choice models
unobserved choice
moral hazard
guber-natorial elections
JEL: 
C10
C14
C18
C51
D72
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
943.75 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.