Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/211128 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
cemmap working paper No. CWP35/19
Verlag: 
Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice (cemmap), London
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper develops identification and estimation methods for dynamic structural models when agents' actions are unobserved by econometricians. We provide conditions under which choice probabilities and latent state transition rules are nonparametrically identified with a continuous state variable in a single-agent dynamic discrete choice model. Our identification results extend to (1) models with serially correlated unobserved heterogeneity and continuous choices, (2) cases in which only discrete state variables are available, and (3) dynamic discrete games. We apply our method to study moral hazard problems in US gubernatorial elections. We find that the probabilities of shirking increase as the governors approach the end of their terms.
Schlagwörter: 
dynamic discrete choice models
unobserved choice
moral hazard
guber-natorial elections
JEL: 
C10
C14
C18
C51
D72
D82
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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