Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/210894
Authors: 
Sarfati, Mahir
Hesamzadeh, Mohammad Reza
Holmberg, Pär
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
IFN Working Paper 1253
Abstract: 
This paper is part I of a two-part paper. It proposes a two-stage game to analyze imperfect competition of producers in zonal power markets with a day-ahead and a real-time market. We consider strategic producers in both markets. They need to take both markets into account when deciding what to bid in each market. The demand shocks between these markets are modeled by several scenarios. The two-stage game is formulated as a Twostage Stochastic Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (TS-EPEC). Then it is further reformulated as a two-stage stochastic Mixed-Integer Linear Program (MILP). The solution of this MILP gives the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE). To tackle multiple SPNE, we design a procedure which finds all SPNE with different total dispatch costs. The proposed MILP model is solved using Benders decomposition embedded in the CPLEX solver. The proposed MILP model is demonstrated on the 6-node and the IEEE 30-node example systems.
Subjects: 
Two-stage game
Zonal pricing
Two-stage equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints
Wholesale electricity market
JEL: 
C61
C63
C72
D43
L13
L94
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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