Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/210894 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 1253
Verlag: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper is part I of a two-part paper. It proposes a two-stage game to analyze imperfect competition of producers in zonal power markets with a day-ahead and a real-time market. We consider strategic producers in both markets. They need to take both markets into account when deciding what to bid in each market. The demand shocks between these markets are modeled by several scenarios. The two-stage game is formulated as a Twostage Stochastic Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (TS-EPEC). Then it is further reformulated as a two-stage stochastic Mixed-Integer Linear Program (MILP). The solution of this MILP gives the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE). To tackle multiple SPNE, we design a procedure which finds all SPNE with different total dispatch costs. The proposed MILP model is solved using Benders decomposition embedded in the CPLEX solver. The proposed MILP model is demonstrated on the 6-node and the IEEE 30-node example systems.
Schlagwörter: 
Two-stage game
Zonal pricing
Two-stage equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints
Wholesale electricity market
JEL: 
C61
C63
C72
D43
L13
L94
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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