Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/208580
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Working paper No. 1-2016
Publisher: 
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics, Frederiksberg
Abstract: 
This paper examines the effect of bid regulations on the range of potential equilibrium prices in a multi-unit uniform price auction with heterogenous bidders. General bid caps destroy equilibria with prices above the bid cap and create new equilibria with prices way below the cap. A cap only for larger firms does not guarantee market prices below that cap. A sufficiently high bid floor only for smaller firms destroys some or all pure strategy equilibria despite their prices being above the bid floor. With a general bid floor this happens only with considerably higher bid floors.
Subjects: 
Multi-unit Auctions
Heterogenous Bidders
Bid Regulation
JEL: 
D43
D44
L12
L13
L51
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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