Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/208580 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working paper No. 1-2016
Verlag: 
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics, Frederiksberg
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper examines the effect of bid regulations on the range of potential equilibrium prices in a multi-unit uniform price auction with heterogenous bidders. General bid caps destroy equilibria with prices above the bid cap and create new equilibria with prices way below the cap. A cap only for larger firms does not guarantee market prices below that cap. A sufficiently high bid floor only for smaller firms destroys some or all pure strategy equilibria despite their prices being above the bid floor. With a general bid floor this happens only with considerably higher bid floors.
Schlagwörter: 
Multi-unit Auctions
Heterogenous Bidders
Bid Regulation
JEL: 
D43
D44
L12
L13
L51
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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