Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/208481 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Working paper No. 6-2004
Publisher: 
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics, Frederiksberg
Abstract: 
This paper examines the welfare implications of non-discriminatory tariff reforms by a subset of countries, which we term a non-preferential trading club. We show that there exist coordinated tariff reforms, accompanied by appropriate income transfers between the member countries, that unambiguously increase the welfare of these countries while leaving the welfare of non-members unaltered. In terms of economic policy implications, our results show that there exist regional, MFN-consistent arrangements that lead to Pareto improvements in world welfare.
Subjects: 
Trading clubs
non-preferential tariff reform
Kemp-Wan-Ohyama proposition
JEL: 
F15
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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