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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working paper No. 6-2004
Verlag: 
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics, Frederiksberg
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper examines the welfare implications of non-discriminatory tariff reforms by a subset of countries, which we term a non-preferential trading club. We show that there exist coordinated tariff reforms, accompanied by appropriate income transfers between the member countries, that unambiguously increase the welfare of these countries while leaving the welfare of non-members unaltered. In terms of economic policy implications, our results show that there exist regional, MFN-consistent arrangements that lead to Pareto improvements in world welfare.
Schlagwörter: 
Trading clubs
non-preferential tariff reform
Kemp-Wan-Ohyama proposition
JEL: 
F15
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