Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/208369 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 19-054
Verlag: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
Voters dealing with jurisdictional merger decisions face a trade-off between economies of scale and preference costs. Larger jurisdictions may offer cost advantages, yet the downside is that policies in larger units may be less aligned to voter preferences. Our study is the first to provide evidence on this trade-off on the individual level in an experimental set-up. For this purpose, we designed a randomized survey experiment and inquired about preferences on state mergers on a representative sample of the German population. In line with the decentralization theorem, the support for mergers increases with cost savings and falls with preference costs measured as political alignment, respectively. The effects of the cost treatments on merger support are lower for respondents from states that are actually discussed as merger candidates. Effects are also weaker for citizens who have a positive view of their own political participation under the status quo.
Schlagwörter: 
state-level mergers
optimal design of federations
economies of scale
political representation
survey experiment
decentralization theorem
JEL: 
H11
H77
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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