Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/204932 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers No. 19-06
Publisher: 
University of Bern, Department of Economics, Bern
Abstract: 
This paper generalizes the price discrimination framework of Mussa and Rosen (1978) by considering salience-driven consumer preferences in the sense of Bordalo et al. (2013b). Consumers with salience-driven preferences give a higher weight to attributes that vary more. This reduces the monopolist's propensity to treat different types of consumers differently. The paper's main result characterizes the conditions under which the monopolist induces consumers to focus on price rather than on quality.
Subjects: 
Salience
price discrimination
monopolist
JEL: 
D11
D42
D91
L11
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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