Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/204714
Authors: 
Chlaß, Nadine
Güth, Werner
Miettinen, Topi
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
SITE Working Paper No. 3
Abstract: 
Most research in economics models agents somehow motivated by outcomes. Here, we model agents motivated by procedures instead, where procedures are defined independently of an outcome. To that end, we design procedures which yield the same expected outcomes or carry the same information on other's intentions while they have different outcome-invariant properties. Agents are experimentally confirmed to exhibit preferences over these which link to psychological attributes of their moral judgment.
Subjects: 
procedural preferences
experiment
institutional design
JEL: 
C90
C78
D02
D63
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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