Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/204714
Autoren: 
Chlaß, Nadine
Güth, Werner
Miettinen, Topi
Datum: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SITE Working Paper No. 3
Zusammenfassung: 
Most research in economics models agents somehow motivated by outcomes. Here, we model agents motivated by procedures instead, where procedures are defined independently of an outcome. To that end, we design procedures which yield the same expected outcomes or carry the same information on other's intentions while they have different outcome-invariant properties. Agents are experimentally confirmed to exhibit preferences over these which link to psychological attributes of their moral judgment.
Schlagwörter: 
procedural preferences
experiment
institutional design
JEL: 
C90
C78
D02
D63
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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