Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/202614 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2017-2
Publisher: 
Brown University, Department of Economics, Providence, RI
Abstract: 
We present results from a repeated public goods experiment where subjects choose by vote one of two sanctioning schemes: peer-to-peer (informal) or centralized (formal). We introduce, in some treatments, a moderate amount of noise (a 10 percent probability that a contribution is reported incorrectly) affecting either one or both sanctioning environments. We find that the institution with more accurate information is always by far the most popular, but noisy information undermines the popularity of peer-to-peer sanctions more strongly than that of centralized sanctions. This may contribute to explaining the greater reliance on centralized sanctioning institutions in complex environments.
Subjects: 
Public goods
sanctions
information
institution
voting
JEL: 
H41
C92
D02
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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