Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202006
Authors: 
Morrow, Peter
Smart, Michael
Swistak, Artur
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 7780
Abstract: 
We develop a simple structural model of value added tax (VAT) compliance, and estimate it using widely available national accounts data to learn about compliance in countries where little is currently known. International border controls improve VAT compliance, generating a correlation between imports and aggregate VAT revenues that is informative about domestic non-compliance. Estimates suggest that revenue lost due to domestic non-compliance is large, particularly in countries with low perceived institutional quality. Border controls keep overall VAT revenues high especially in countries open to international trade.
JEL: 
H25
H26
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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