Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/201988 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7762
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We study experimentally when, why, and how people intervene in others’ choices. Choice Architects (CAs) construct opportunity sets containing bundles of time-indexed payments for Choosers. CAs frequently prevent impatient choices despite opportunities to provide advice, believing Choosers benefit. We consider several hypotheses concerning CAs’ motives. A conventional behavioral welfarist acts as a correctly informed social planner; a mistakes-projective paternalist removes options she wishes she could reject when choosing for herself; an ideals-projective paternalist seeks to align others’ choices with her own aspirations. Ideals-projective paternalism provides the best explanation for interventions in the laboratory and rationalizes support for actual paternalistic policies.
Subjects: 
paternalism
libertarianism
welfare economics
experiment
false consensus bias
JEL: 
D03
D04
H00
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.