Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/201950 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7724
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
To reconcile the mixed empirical results, we develop a theoretical model whose main implication is a concave impact of regulation on the probability of a crisis. We test this relationship by applying a Probit model of a non-linear specification to annual data from 1999 to 2011 drawn from 132 countries. The probability of a financial crisis fits an inverted U-shaped curve: it rises as regulation stringency moves from low to medium levels and falls from medium to high levels. Countries located at the intermediate level of regulatory stringency face more instability than countries that are either loosely or severely regulated. We identify the latter two groups as falling in “liberalization traps”. Institutional quality interacts significantly with the regulatory environment.
Subjects: 
crisis
banks
institutions
liberalization
regulation
JEL: 
G01
G21
G28
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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