Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/201939 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7713
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Numerous theoretical studies have shown that information aggregation through voting is fragile. We consider a model of information aggregation with vote-contingent payoffs and generically characterize voting behavior in large committees. We use this characterization to identify the set of vote-contingent payoffs that lead to a unique outcome that robustly aggregates information. Generally, it is not sufficient to simply reward agents for matching their vote to the true state of the world. Instead, robust and unique information aggregation can be achieved with vote-contingent payoffs whose size varies depending on which option the committee chooses, and whether the committee decision is correct.
Subjects: 
information aggregation
voting
vote-contingent payoffs
JEL: 
D71
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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