Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/201607 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers No. 583
Publisher: 
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Abstract: 
Smith (1995) presented a necessary and sufficient condition for the finite- horizon perfect folk theorem. In the proof of this result, the author constructed a family of five-phase strategy profiles to approach feasible and individually rational payoff vec- tors of the stage-game. These strategy profiles are not subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the finitely repeated game. I illustrate this fact with a counter-example. However, the characterization of attainable payoff vectors by Smith remains true. I provide an alternative proof.
Subjects: 
Finitely Repeated Games
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
Folk Theorem
Discount Factor
JEL: 
C72
C73
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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