Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/197735 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1006
Publisher: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Abstract: 
We examine multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). In our model, an informed expert can send messages to an uninformed decision maker more than once, and the uninformed decision maker can pay money to the informed expert voluntarily whenever she receives a message. Our results are that under some conditions (i) the decision maker can obtain more detailed information from the expert than that in the Crawford and Sobel model and (ii) there exists an equilibrium whose outcome Pareto dominates all the equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford and Sobel model. Moreover, we find the upper bound of the receiver's equilibrium payoff, and provide a sufficient condition for it to be approximated by the receiver's payoff under a certain equilibrium.
Subjects: 
Incomplete information
Cheap talk
Multistage strategic communication
Voluntary monetary transfer
JEL: 
C72
C73
D82
D83
Additional Information: 
The 19th ISER-Moriguchi Prize (2016) Awarded Paper.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
278.14 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.