Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/197207 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2017 [Pages:] 909-956
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
This paper suggests a novel way to import the approach of axiomatic theories of individual choice into strategic settings and demonstrates the benefits of this approach. We propose both a tractable behavioral model as well as axioms applied to the behavior of the collection of players, focusing first on prisoners' dilemma games. A representation theorem establishes these axioms as the precise behavioral content of the model, and that the model's parameters are (essentially) uniquely identified from behavior. The behavioral model features magical thinking: players behave as if their expectations about their opponents' behavior vary with their own choices. The model provides a unified view of documented behavior in a range of often studied games, such as the prisoners' dilemma, the battle of the sexes, hawk-dove, and the stag hunt, and also generates novel predictions across games.
Subjects: 
Magical thinking
axioms/representation theorem
prisoners' dilemma
coordination games
JEL: 
C7
D8
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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