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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2017 [Pages:] 1-24
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
We study a two-sided matching market with a set of heterogeneous firms and workers in an environment where jobs are secured by regulation. Without job security Kelso and Crawford have shown that stable outcomes and efficiency prevail when all workers are gross substitutes to each firm. It turns out that by introducing job security, stability and efficiency may still prevail, and even for a significantly broader class of production functions.
Schlagwörter: 
Matching
stability
labor market
job security
efficiency
JEL: 
C78
D44
D82
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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Dokumentart: 
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