Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/197130 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2017 [Pages:] 1155-1189
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
We study learning and information acquisition by a Bayesian agent whose prior belief is misspecified in the sense that it assigns probability 0 to the true state of the world. At each instant, the agent takes an action and observes the corresponding payoff, which is the sum of a fixed but unknown function of the action and an additive error term. We provide a complete characterization of asymptotic actions and beliefs when the agent's subjective state space is a doubleton. A simple example with three actions shows that in a misspecified environment a myopic agent's beliefs converge while a sufficiently patient agent's beliefs do not. This illustrates a novel interaction between misspecification and the agent's subjective discount rate.
Schlagwörter: 
Active learning
learning in games
misspecified models
JEL: 
D83
D90
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