Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/197128
Authors: 
Hellman, Ziv
Levy, Yehuda John
Year of Publication: 
2017
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 12 [Year:] 2017 [Issue:] 3 [Pages:] 1089-1120
Abstract: 
We show that every Bayesian game with purely atomic types has a measurable Bayesian equilibrium when the common knowledge relation is smooth. Conversely, for any common knowledge relation that is not smooth, there exists a type space that yields this common knowledge relation and payoffs such that the resulting Bayesian game does not have any Bayesian equilibrium. We show that our smoothness condition also rules out two paradoxes involving Bayesian games with a continuum of types: the impossibility of having a common prior on components when a common prior over the entire state space exists, and the possibility of interim betting/trade even when no such trade can be supported ex ante.
Subjects: 
Bayesian games
Bayesian equilibrium
common priors
continuum of states
JEL: 
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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