Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/195565
Authors: 
Kline, Brendan
Year of Publication: 
2018
Citation: 
[Journal:] Quantitative Economics [ISSN:] 1759-7331 [Volume:] 9 [Year:] 2018 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 141-181
Abstract: 
This paper studies the identification and estimation of the decision rules that in- dividuals use to determine their actions in games, based on a structural econo- metric model of non-equilibrium behavior in games. The model is based pri- marily on various notions of limited strategic reasoning, allowing multiple modes of strategic reasoning and heterogeneity in strategic reasoning across individu- als and within individuals. The paper proposes the model and provides sufficient conditions for point identification of the model. Then the model is estimated on data from an experiment involving two-player guessing games. The application illustrates the empirical relevance of the main features of the model.
Subjects: 
Games
heterogeneity
identification
non-equilibrium
strategic reasoning
JEL: 
C1
C57
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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