Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/195565 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Quantitative Economics [ISSN:] 1759-7331 [Volume:] 9 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2018 [Pages:] 141-181
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies the identification and estimation of the decision rules that in- dividuals use to determine their actions in games, based on a structural econo- metric model of non-equilibrium behavior in games. The model is based pri- marily on various notions of limited strategic reasoning, allowing multiple modes of strategic reasoning and heterogeneity in strategic reasoning across individu- als and within individuals. The paper proposes the model and provides sufficient conditions for point identification of the model. Then the model is estimated on data from an experiment involving two-player guessing games. The application illustrates the empirical relevance of the main features of the model.
Schlagwörter: 
Games
heterogeneity
identification
non-equilibrium
strategic reasoning
JEL: 
C1
C57
C72
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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