Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/195278
Authors: 
Ninjbat, Uuganbaatar
Year of Publication: 
2018
Citation: 
[Journal:] SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association [ISSN:] 1869-4195 [Volume:] 9 [Year:] 2018 [Issue:] 3 [Pages:] 333-350
Abstract: 
The problem of social choice is studied on a domain with countably many individuals. In contrast to most of the existing literature which establish either non-constructive possibilities or approximate (i.e. invisible) dictators, we show that if one adds a continuity property to the usual set of axioms, the classical impossibilities persist in countable societies. Along the way, a new proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in the style of Peter Fishburn's well known proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem is obtained.
Subjects: 
Arrow's impossibility theorem
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
Infinite society
Continuity
JEL: 
D70
D71
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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