Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/194130
Authors: 
Britz, Volker
Ebrahimi, Afsoon
Gersbach, Hans
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Working Paper Series 18/307
Abstract: 
We study how to efficiently motivate policy-makers to solve political multitask problems. Political multi-task problems typically have outcomes that are difficult to measure. Moreover, there are conflicts among citizens about optimal policies and the agents have the power to tax the citizens to invest in better outcomes of some tasks. We develop a political agency model with two tasks and only one measurable outcome. In such an environment, policy-makers choose socially inefficient public good levels and expropriate minorities. A judicious combination of constitutional limits on taxation and incentive pay for policy-makers is second-best. Incentive pay is conditional on the public good level.
Subjects: 
incentive contracts
politicians
multi-task problems
JEL: 
D72
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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