Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/194130 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 18/307
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
We study how to efficiently motivate policy-makers to solve political multitask problems. Political multi-task problems typically have outcomes that are difficult to measure. Moreover, there are conflicts among citizens about optimal policies and the agents have the power to tax the citizens to invest in better outcomes of some tasks. We develop a political agency model with two tasks and only one measurable outcome. In such an environment, policy-makers choose socially inefficient public good levels and expropriate minorities. A judicious combination of constitutional limits on taxation and incentive pay for policy-makers is second-best. Incentive pay is conditional on the public good level.
Schlagwörter: 
incentive contracts
politicians
multi-task problems
JEL: 
D72
D82
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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