Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/194000 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WZB Discussion Paper No. SP II 2018-208
Verlag: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We use a range of dictator game experiments to investigate whether people avoid information altruistically. After learning about a product with positive externalities, a consumer may avoid learning the cost of the product so that she does not hesitate to act altruistically. We find that although a few altruistic people avoid information about their own costs, this does not change the overall rate of altruistic behavior. The result suggests that although concealing costs upfront might make a few people let go of learning them, it does not increase the rate of altruistic behavior.
Schlagwörter: 
Pro-social behavior
Self-Image
Information Avoidance
Moral Wiggle Room
JEL: 
C91
D64
D83
D01
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
471.94 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.