Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/192916 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 307
Publisher: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Abstract: 
Sellers often have the power to censor the reviews of their products. We explore the effect of these censorship policies in markets where some consumers are unaware of possible censorship. We find that if the share of such "naive" consumers is not too large, then rational consumers treat any bad review that is revealed in equilibrium as good news about product quality. This makes bad reviews worth revealing and allows the high-type seller to use them as a costly signal of his product's quality to rational consumers.
Subjects: 
Censorship
dynamic games
disclosure
moderated learning
JEL: 
D82
D83
D90
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
863.47 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.