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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7408
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We exploit the precise timing of natural disasters to provide empirical evidence on the connection between electoral accountability and politicians’ support for special interests. We show that, in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, the evening news substantially reduce their coverage of politics. At the very same time, members of Congress become more likely to adopt the positions of special-interest donors as they vote on bills. Our findings are consistent with standard theories of political agency, according to which politicians are more inclined to serve special interests when, for exogenous reasons, they are less intensely monitored.
Schlagwörter: 
natural disasters
moral hazard
toll-call voting
special interests
Congress
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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