Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19092
Authors: 
Fischer, Justina A. V.
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 1628
Abstract: 
The deleterious impact of institutions of direct legislation on student performance found in studies for both the U.S. and Switzerland has raised the question of what its transmission channels are. For the U.S., an increase in the ratio of administrative to instructional spending and larger class sizes were observed, supporting the hypothesis of a Leviathan-like school administration. For Switzerland, using a cross-sectional time-series panel of sub-federal school expenditure and size of classes, no such effect is detected. This finding is in line with previous analyses in which efficiency gains in the provision of public goods for Switzerland have been found.
Subjects: 
direct democracy
median voter
bureaucracy
public education
JEL: 
I22
H41
H72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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