Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/190085 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WIDER Working Paper No. 2018/36
Verlag: 
The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), Helsinki
Zusammenfassung: 
In 2006, the Bolivian government introduced a large-scale cash transfer programme, Bono Juancito Pinto (BJP). Exploiting the exogenous variation of the programme expansion, this paper examines the impact of BJP on schooling and child labour. The analysis suggests that the transfer increases the likelihood of school enrolment but has no sizeable effect on the incidence of child labour. The results are in line with theoretical models that predict that if leisure and schooling decisions are substitutes, a school incentive will have either positive or neutral effects on child labour. Our findings support previous evidence that schooling and work decisions are not perfect substitutes among children.
Schlagwörter: 
Bolivia
child labour
conditional cash transfers
schooling
JEL: 
I25
I38
J13
J22
N36
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-92-9256-478-0
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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