Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/189472
Authors: 
Nehring, Klaus
Marcellino, Massimiliano
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper 98-2
Abstract: 
We show that Maskin monotone social choice correspondences on sufficiently rich domains satisfy a generalized strategy-proofness property, thus generalizing Muller and Satterthwaite''s (1977) theorem to correspondences. From the point of view of Nash implementation theory, the result yields a partial characterization of the restrictions entailed by Nash implementability. Alternatively, the result can be viewed as a possibility theorem on the dominant-strategy-implementability of monotone SCCs via set-valued mechanisms for agents who are completely ignorant about the finally selected outcome. It is shown by examples that stronger strategy-proofness properties fail easily.
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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