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Erscheinungsjahr: 
1998
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 98-2
Verlag: 
University of California, Department of Economics, Davis, CA
Zusammenfassung: 
We show that Maskin monotone social choice correspondences on sufficiently rich domains satisfy a generalized strategy-proofness property, thus generalizing Muller and Satterthwaite''s (1977) theorem to correspondences. From the point of view of Nash implementation theory, the result yields a partial characterization of the restrictions entailed by Nash implementability. Alternatively, the result can be viewed as a possibility theorem on the dominant-strategy-implementability of monotone SCCs via set-valued mechanisms for agents who are completely ignorant about the finally selected outcome. It is shown by examples that stronger strategy-proofness properties fail easily.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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