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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 1004
Verlag: 
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies optimal linear income taxation and redistributive social insurance when the former has the traditional labor distortion and the latter generates both ex ante and ex post moral hazard. Private insurance is available and individuals differ in labor productivity and in loss probability. We show that government intervention in insurance markets is welfare-improving, and social insurance is generally desirable when there is a negative correlation between labor productivity and loss probability.
Schlagwörter: 
Social Insurance
Moral Hazard
Redistribution
JEL: 
H23
H51
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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