Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/189160 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1991
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 836
Verlag: 
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we establish a complete characterization of the strategic interaction of firms in sequential entry models. The limit price plays an important coordinating role in non-cooperative sequential entry models. We show that for many firms in a large range of sequential entry equilibria, the limit price is effectively parametric, so that firms make investment decisions in a quasi-competitive manner. Entry deterrence is only pursued by firms at the beginning of the sequence if it is profitable; otherwise it is delegated to the last firms to enter.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
2.57 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.