Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/189155
Authors: 
Boadway, Robin
Marceau, Nicolas
Year of Publication: 
1991
Series/Report no.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 831
Abstract: 
A model is constructed in which, given the inability of implicit contracts to be self-enforcing, a minimum wage policy combined with unemployment insurance can be welfare-improving. Unemployment insurance can be decentralized to the private sector if the government can commit to a minimum wage. However, if it cannot , a government which acts in the interest of the workers will have an incentive to increase the minimum wage to exploit private insurers. The full commitment optimum can be achieved by publicly provided unemployment insurance.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.