Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/189143 
Year of Publication: 
1991
Series/Report no.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 819
Publisher: 
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
Abstract: 
Closer international integration is putting increasing pressure on existing national tax structures. this paper uses a simple two-country model to address a range of policy concerns that consequently arise, focusing particularly on the role of national size. Differences in size exacerbate the inefficiency due to non-cooperative behavior, harming both countries. The smaller country would lose form harmonization to any tax rate between those of the non-cooperative equilibrium, but both countries would gain from the imposition of a minimum tax anywhere in that range. The fully optimal response to freer cross-border trade, however, may be to do absolutely nothing.
JEL: 
320
423
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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