Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18801
Authors: 
Kolmar, Martin
Meier, Volker
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 1437
Abstract: 
In an environment with asymmetric information the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves-Vickrey (D?Aspremont-Gérard-Varet) mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can generally be covered in every generation if the growth rate of the economy is positive. This result yields an alternative explanation for the existence of pay-as-you-go financed transfer mechanisms.
Subjects: 
pay-as-you-go
externalities
mechanism design
adverse selection
JEL: 
H55
H23
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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