Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18785
Authors: 
Bellettini, Giorgio
Ceroni, Carlotta Berti
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 1421
Abstract: 
This paper studies the determinants of immigration policy in an economy with entrepreneurs and workers where a trade union has monopoly power over wages. The presence of the union leads a benevolent government to implement a high level of immigration and induces a welfare loss not only from an aggregate point of view, but even from the point of view of workers. In the politico-economic equilibrium where interest groups lobby for immigration, we show the condition under which workers are no longer hurt by the presence of the union.
JEL: 
J61
J51
F22
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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