Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/187432
Authors: 
Gemmo, Irina
Kubitza, Christian
Rothschild, Casey G.
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
ICIR Working Paper Series 32/18
Abstract: 
We prove the existence of an equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection in the sense of Miyazaki (1977), Wilson (1977), and Spence (1978) when the distribution of unobservable risk types is continuous. Our proof leverages the finite-type proof in Spence (1978) and a limiting argument akin to Hellwig (2007)'s study of optimal taxation.
Subjects: 
asymmetric and private information
insurance market
adverse selection
equilibrium
JEL: 
D82
G22
D41
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Social Media Mentions:

Files in This Item:
File
Size
908.92 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.