Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185542
Authors: 
Aprile, Maria Carmela
Chiarini, Bruno
Marzano, Elisabetta
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7344
Abstract: 
This paper presents a simple strategic model (defined as a shortsighted game) to highlight the incentives for local governments to allow the exploitation of land in areas not suitable for such exploitation due to environmental or other risks. Municipal discretionary policy inevitably produces strategic complementarities and guides individuals to use the land (to choose the most beneficial “shortsighted” Nash equilibrium). In light of these results, it seems possible to state that the definition of non-exploitable territory and the decisions concerning it should not be left to local governments.
Subjects: 
land exploitation
municipal policy
strategic complementarities
myopic equilibrium
JEL: 
C72
H31
H77
Q24
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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