Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185479
Authors: 
Meier, Volker
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7281
Abstract: 
We consider positive and normative aspects of subsidizing work arrangements where subsidies are paid in time of low demand and reduced working hours so as to stabilize workers’ income. In a matching framework such an arrangement increases labor demand. Tightening eligibility to short-time work benefits tends to reduce the wage while the impact on unemployment remains ambiguous. We develop a modified Hosios condition characterizing an efficient combination of labor market tightness and short-time benefit loss rate.
Subjects: 
short-time work
unemployment insurance
employment subsidies
JEL: 
E24
H24
J41
J63
J64
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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