Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/185459 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7261
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We study the relative performance of the first‐price sealed‐bid auction and the second-price sealed‐bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behaviour to an outside observer. We consider two different information settings: the auctioneer reveals either the identity of the winning bidder only, or she also reveals the winner’s payment to an outside observer. We find that the first‐price sealed‐bid auction in which the winner’s payment is revealed outperforms the other mechanisms in terms of revenue and efficiency. Our findings may have implications for the design of charity auctions, art auctions, and spectrum auctions.
Subjects: 
auctions
signalling
experiments
JEL: 
C92
D44
D92
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.