Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185410
Authors: 
Gamalerio, Matteo
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7212
Abstract: 
Do electoral incentives affect immigration policies? I study this question in the setting of Italian municipalities making decisions about the reception of refugees. The localized control of the reception policy (SPRAR), combined with the exogenous timing of policy decisions and staggered elections, enables me to study the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees. Although municipalities receive fiscal grants for hosting refugees, electoral incentives reduce the probability of opening a refugee centre by 24 per cent. The effect is driven by voters’ misperceptions of immigrants and by extreme-right political preferences. The results explain why is difficult to reach an equal redistribution of refugees across and within countries.
Subjects: 
migration
reception of refugees
electoral incentives
fiscal grants
JEL: 
R23
J61
D72
C23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.