Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/183870 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] DIW Weekly Report [ISSN:] 2568-7697 [Volume:] 8 [Issue:] 42 [Publisher:] Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) [Place:] Berlin [Year:] 2018 [Pages:] 407-414
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
In recent years, the global community has promoted several initiatives aimed at breaking bank secrecy in tax havens. Such treaties for the exchange of information among tax offices can be effective. A treaty between country A and tax haven B reduces deposits from A in banks of B by approximately 30 percent. However, the analysis shows that tax evaders react to such treaties not by becoming honest taxpayers but rather by adapting their practice of tax evasion. Consequently, the international community must crack down on tax evasion more aggressively - for example, by disclosing the final beneficiaries of assets in tax havens or making it difficult for financial institutions in tax havens to access international capital markets.
Schlagwörter: 
tax evasion
international information exchange treaties
international bank deposits
tax havens
JEL: 
H26
F38
Dokumentart: 
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