Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/180237 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 6975
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that the poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. The reasons for this are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games. Our subjects provide low-quality information even when doing so does not increase their monetary payoff.
Subjects: 
experiment
cheap talk
auction
information acquisition
information sale
JEL: 
D83
C72
G14
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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